How successful is Descartes' use of a benevolent creator in answering the challenge of scepticism?
Scepticism refers to a range of views, which broadly deny that “some term of positive epistemic appraisal applies to our beliefs.” They range from the extreme (‘all beliefs are totally and inherently false’), to narrower concerns, about certain subjects, or necessary degrees of justification. In his 'Meditations’, Descartes sought to use a sceptical approach, not to wallow in darkness, but to find the true meaning of reality; his “clear and distinct” ideas. He called on certain assumable constructs, such as the existence of the 'self’, and 'God’, to form the basis of later reasoning. This essay will examine Descartes’ 'proof’ of a benevolent creator’s existence, and its applications in creating creating a solid understanding of reality. It will conclude that, while the arguments are usually logically sound, the overall 'benevolent creator’ thesis is rarely strong enough to overcome the relevant sceptical criticisms.
Of course, a “benevolent creator” can only answer the challenge of scepticism if it exists. After outlining his ideas on the existence of himself as a thinking being, the Third Meditation describes three main 'proofs’ for the existence of a God. These must be dependable to form a suitable basis for further argument.
The first main argument concerns the connection between objective and formal reality. Descartes argues that the 'effect’ of “objective perfection” that we can all imagine, must logically have a 'cause’ of formal or 'real’ perfection, I.e. God. The principle of cause and effect seems logically sound, in that if we are finite, imagining the concept of infinity, and therefore God, may be impossible. However, it might be noted that we can imagine the opposite of what we have experienced. Perhaps our knowledge of the finite world allows us to create an idea of infinity as the 'absence of that which is finite’, and therefore construct 'God’ in our own minds.
Another argument for the existence of a benevolent creator used by Descartes is the common and ancient cosmological concept. If humans aren’t universal, we must have been created, but creating ourselves is a logical fallacy. Therefore, we must have a creator, such as God. Again, this argument certainly makes some sense. However, it says nothing about why a creator should necessarily be “benevolent”, or have any relation to Descartes’ particular idea of God. Could we not have been created by some being with only some of the properties of God; perhaps infinite but not perfect?
The third major argument relates to Descartes’ interest in the field of mathematics. The essence of an idea must be connected to its actual existence, as the idea of 3 sides is connected to the existence of a triangle. Therefore, for ontological reasons, God’s existence must be “at least as certain as I have ever held the truths of mathematics”. In some ways, this argument seems like a repetition of previous points, but Descartes is adamant it rests on its own laurels. Unfortunately, the point seems to rest on a particular human arrogance of our language having any universal significance, and it may be that our concept of “God” has no correlation away from our planet.
Having considered the three main arguments, I find them superficially logically sound but open to attack from various fronts. However, to continue I will ignore the flaws and assume that the idea of a benevolent creator is 'proven’. If so, can it really nullify the criticisms of scepticism? If we take the extreme form of scepticism, that all beliefs are false, then the idea of a benevolent creator forms a true belief Any further beliefs logically derived from the idea of God would simply increase the damage to scepticism’s credibility. However, most sceptics follow more moderate version, which allow for the existence of beliefs, even if, for example, the denial of that belief is equally likely to be true. In this case, the usefulness of the benevolent creator will depend on its application.
One such use for the benevolent creator in Descartes’ writing was as the initiator of all physics and motion. He created laws based on the assumption that the motion was both started and sustained by an all-powerful God. The sceptical view here may well be that motion is relative and changing based on circumstances, or at least that its origin cannot be conclusively proved either way. Here, the idea of the benevolent creator does not seem particularly successful. In Descartes time, the understanding of physics and motion was limited, and so the application of a God as the initiator fills in a lot of gaps. However, with modern science, many of the problems can be answered without resorting to such means. For example, Descartes talked about collision theories, which while nicely logical in the 17th century, are now quite inaccurate. The discovery of phenomena such as gravity have, if not validated scepticism, then at least shown the weaknesses of Descartes’ system.
Another application of the 'benevolent creator’ is the idea that all mathematical truths (one of a number of so-called 'eternal truths’) depend on God for their existence. Of course, if He created all, then it makes sense that He must have created mathematical principles as well. The problem is that, Descartes appears to offer no novel proof of why this is true, other than referring back to earlier ideas. Therefore, a sceptical viewpoint of 'such truths may have had other causes’ receives no answer. Perhaps mathematics exists on its own merits, independent of spiritual concerns. Also, there is a more subtle point concerning the context of the writing. At the time of publication, France was a deeply religious place, with immense power invested in the institutions and leaders of theology. Some of Descartes’ ideas, such as the primacy of individual reason and the possibility of an “evil genius” could be seen to be heretical, with disastrous consequences for his academic and personal progress. Essentially stating that 'maths comes from God’ may have been a simple way to promote his views, while appearing subservient to his religious masters.
Perhaps the most important of Descartes’ application was the validation of reason. Before considering it, we must assess the common problem of the Cartesian Circle. This was noted at the time of the Meditations’ publication, and continues to to fuel debate. In simple terms, Descartes’ uses his human reason to 'work out’ that the “benevolent creator” must exist, through his “clear and distinct” perceptions. But then, when the perceptions are questioned, a perfect God’s existence is taken as an assumption. This provides ammunition for sceptics, who question Descartes’ formative thinking. If he has no logically sound proof of the existence of a benevolent creator, then it cannot be used to answer further questions. While he mentions this problem in later letters, a full solution was never codified: a major defect in Descartes’ legacy.
Despite its problems, the validation of reason has to be considered itself. It concerns a crucial tenet of Descartes’ thinking, so much of which relies on human reason as its basis. If God is evil, then he could be affecting reason, and making all assumptions based on it wrong. However, Descartes sees evil as a defect, which a perfect God couldn’t possess, and so must be benevolent. This, according to him, 'validates’ his reason. Putting the Cartesian Circle to one side, the validation relies on some rather wobbly assumptions. For example, assuming evil to be an imperfection requires our idea of 'good’ to be perfect, which seems rather arrogant. How can we be so sure that our concepts of “good” and “evil” match those of God, if such things even exist in a universal sense? Or, a being with the intelligence and power to create the universe may well understand “evil” on a level so far above our own understanding to make it meaningless. In this way, we can see that a viewpoint of 'reason is fallible’, which directly contradicts Descartes’ thinking, has merit. The addition of a benevolent creator to the picture does not remove the doubts about the system.
In conclusion, Descartes’ makes some valid points about human reason when considers what he calls the “benevolent creator”. However, I do not believe it is particularly successful when answering even some relatively simple sceptical concerns. In and of itself, the theory requires major assumptions which may not be logical, and some of the applications are appear in these modern times to be simply incorrect.