How far did the Peace of Versailles succeed in implementing the principle of self-determination?
The Peace of Versailles generally refers to the Treaty of Versailles, ending the Great War of 1914-1918. It is commonly understood that a historical foundation for the modern principle of self-determination, and this essay will examine to what degree this is an accurate portrayal. The essay will conclude that, while the events of 1919 did much to publicize “self-determination” as a phrase, it did little in real terms to advance the concept. The Peace of Versailles was negotiated at the Paris Peace Conference and signed on 28th June 1919, exactly five years after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Conference was a behemoth, involving representing “over thirty countries” (and unofficial representatives from many more). The discussions were divided into fifty-eight committees, comprising 1646 meetings. It is perhaps not surprising that these conditions were not especially conducive to the creation of a new international relations paradigm.
The principle of ‘self-determination’ was mooted by the Bolsheviks around the turn of the 20th century, but it was brought to (Western) attention by Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States during the Great War. Though not (as commonly thought) mentioned in his '14 Points’ speech, it became one of the favoured phrases during negotiations. To his mind, it meant a world of democratic, liberal nation-states; bound to peace in a nascent League of Nations. However, even in 1919 the term quickly acquired ethnic, religious, cultural and other flavours; and has since become the reasoning for actions Wilson could barely have imagined.
To one reading, the Peace of Versailles “accomplished a tremendous amount” for self-determination. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were newly created; Poland and Czechoslovakia were reconstituted. Germany’s colonies were removed, and old sores (such as Alsace-Lorraine) were 'healed’. However, there are deep flaws even within these ostensible successes, and huge failures elsewhere.
Although Wilson’s 'Fourteen Points’ talked of a “safeguarded and assured” Austria-Hungary, it was allowed to break up, even as the economic era called for “larger and larger units” . It is debatable if this was the wish of the populace involved, and contributed to the “collapse of political balance” which may have “ultimately led to World War II” . Similarly, Wilson called for the independence of Montenegro , which was ignored (and didn’t occur till 2006). Poland and Czechoslovakia soon took advantage of the Allies’ favour to annex nearby territory, with no regard to the principle which allowed for their own existence. Furthermore, the very creation of the new Eastern European states was not due to the principle of self-determination. They served as a “Shatter Zone” (la Barrière de l'Est) between a wounded but still powerful Germany, and a newly Bolshevik Russia. In 1919, the creation of Poland (for example) served the strategic interests of the Allies; no other principle was of such importance.
Perhaps the most obvious failure of self-determination was how it was “applied at the losers’ expense” . Lands were taken from Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, with no concern for the people involved. The mass re-organisation of Central and Eastern Europe left many Germans, in language and allegiance, as significant minorities of other countries. It was noted at the time (and turned out so) that this was an incredibly bad idea, but the more foresighted members of the Conference were overruled. Indeed, a realist view was that the large German minorities would ensure German nationalist enmity towards Poland and Czechoslovakia, and so “create allies for a future war” . While reparations were explained as a result of Germany’s war guilt, no explanation was given for why Germans should be denied the rights of self-determination. This includes the ban on Anschluss, i.e. union between Germany and Austria. Also, to consider German colonies across Africa and the Middle East, they certainly weren’t given self-determination. The African holdings in particular became de facto British and French colonies, held under League of Nations 'mandates’, as “ingenious as they were hypocritical” .
If self-determination was a principle of any importance, it was at best very selectively enforced. So was the problem with Wilson’s vision, or was it simply circumvented by other interests? Unfortunately for a man of great idealism, much of the blame must lie with Wilson himself. The Fourteen Points speech certainly outlined a new world order, but any hope of this being implemented was based on a myopic reading of both American and European realities.
While the Roman, Holy Roman and French Empires (among others) had tried to impose a degree of order on Europe, it has always been a patchwork quilt of overlapping communities, differentiated by language, religion, ethnicity, and outlook. Wilson sailed for France in 1918 largely ignorant of these realities, assuming that Europe contained “few recognised nations, and plenty of room for them” . Attempts by the European Allies to point out these problems were muted by their dependence on American aid, and a general disdain for “Eastern” issues.
Arguably, the very fact Wilson was in France was a problem, forcing a man who “excelled in the exposition of fundamentals” to argue over details he was ill-equipped to decide. For example, much of his time was devoted to the “Adriatic” question, the Italian desire for ethnically Croat Rijeka (Fiume) and surrounding islands. He saw this as a “touchstone for his principles” , but got bogged down in minor squabbles. In America, Wilson’s long sojourn to Paris was not popular, reflecting the tension between American internationalism and isolationism. The Treaty he had worked so hard for was rejected by the US Senate, partly because of his stubborn refusal of more domestically palatable amendments, and ailing health. This hints at the structural problem with the Peace of Versailles. Unlike previous attempts to remake the world order, the discussions were not inclusive. The “real work” was accomplished by the Big Four (America, Britain, France and Italy), with the occasional addition of Japan. The lack of Russia (due to the Brest-Litvosk treaty) and Germany meant the conference was, rather ridiculously, negotiating the future of Europe without representatives from “well over half” of its population.
Another major tenet of self-determination which emerged in 1919 was that of minority rights. The Allies “all appeared friendly” to such a principle during the war, but such dedication was forgotten when the guns were silenced. This is not surprising when the hypocrisy of such a position is considered. In America, “the yellow or black man” would remain second class citizens for a further forty years. Indeed, America made sure the Japanese proposal of a “clause endorsing racial equality” in the Treaty was rejected. Similarly, Britain made sure the “incendiary topic” of colonisation was kept off the table, by refusing to hear the nationalist representatives of Egypt and Vietnam. At home, Irish nationalism was still being suppressed, with the full support of Wilson’s America. In 1916, while the Allies were supposed to be fighting for the 'free peoples’, the Irish leaders of the Easter Rising were executed for attempting to regain ethnic and national autonomy.
The greatest problem with the promotion of self-determination is the issue of its definition. Does it refer to a “race, a territorial area or a community” ? Perhaps “the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people” ? Reductio ad absurdum, the principle could be seen as an atomisation of international relations, promising a Pyrrhic victory of peace only when no man is ruled by another. In other words, the principle is in great need of refining and narrowing for practical application, i.e. “choosing among competing nationalisms” , but Wilson was rather less adept at such work. Exactly why Poland deserved it in 1919, but the “Indians or Southern States” didn’t the previous century, is left unclear. To take another of Wilson’s creations, the League of Nations, there are still issues. The concept was invented in London, a “bastion of balance-of-power diplomacy” , to tempt America into the war. If the world were the democratic utopia envisioned by Wilson, then it would be inherently defunct. Or, if the world is full of undemocratic states with little interest in reducing sovereignty, it becomes “unworkable” . This is certainly a cynical viewpoint, but seems to be borne out in history. Wilson, sadly, couldn’t explain what would happen if “the people did not want a democratic system.” Events during his presidency in Latin America, especially involving democratically-elected leaders forced out by American might, show the inconsistency of Wilson’s idealism.
In conclusion, I do not believe that the Peace of Versailles was successful in implementing the principle of self-determination. Much as with every major conference before, and since, it rested on the interests of the great powers, allowing altruistic idealism only within the narrow areas where such realities had not already decided a course. The conference at Paris may have greatly publicised the concept, but its enactment, if at all, was largely against the desires of the parties involved.