Does Thrasymachus’ position in the Republic pose a threat to morality?

(N.B. The degree to which the Republic represents an historic record or the creative musings of Plato is hotly debated to this day, but the ‘positions of Thrasymachus and Socrates’ will simply refer here to the views espoused in the text.)

The position of Thrasymachus, neatly outlined in “justice is simply what is good for the stronger” , and our currently, inherently 'other-regarding’ morality, seem to be mutually exclusive. If the Ancient cynic were proven correct, would this not render our ethical system worthless, or at the very least damaged? This seems to require two simultaneous points; that the position is logically coherent within itself, and that it somehow overrules common morality. Therefore, I will answer the question by analysing Thrasymachus’ position on its own merits, then compare it to what we now consider 'right’ and examine the effects. I will conclude that, both by being a flawed theory, and being unable to undermine the formations of morality, it does not pose a threat.

Athens in the fourth century BC had no directly translatable word for “morality”, but its intellectual circles had a fascination with both the meaning and motivation of “justice”. Ancient Athenian “justice” and today’s “morality” are not exactly the same thing, but greatly overlap. This allows a grievous attack on justice, attempted by Thrasymachus, to be damaging for morality, even over two thousand years later. In the Republic, Socrates discusses a number of answers to “what is justice”, beginning with the most common of the time, to “pay everyone what is owed to him” . Thrasymachus, a man of “coarseness” and “cynicism” , isn’t “explicitly identified”  with the  Sophists, but is understood to lean towards such an outlook. He attempts to conclude the discussion with his most famous pronouncement, mentioned above. Analysed on its own, this provides innumerable queries and problems, but the position is somewhat refined during the intercourse. For example, the “stronger” is taken to mean the currently ruling political power, sidestepping Socrates’ somewhat facetious point about physical strength. Thrasymachus believes that, irrespective of the ideology or make-up of the government, it simply “makes laws for its own good” , to the harm of the populace. Socrates follows the logic to its conclusion, showing that it argues for the populace to follow the ruler’s edicts even when if it is “not good for the stronger” , thus violating the foundation of the theory.

Here we come across one of the most basic problems of Thrasymachus’ position, that of motivation. As a supposed expert, he seeks to earn a living by 'teaching’ rulers the way to success (not unlike the self-help books of today). For this, he needs his theory to be both applicable to as many possible clients as possible, but also clear and authoritative. To this end, his position involves large doses of objectivity and relativism. The objective truth comes from the power of the “stronger”, to which no disagreement is allowed or particular justification given. However, in keeping the theory vague (e.g., on what constitutes a true ruler), everything is nicely relative and applicable to all potential lords. In the text, Cleitophon offers an imperfect but philosophically valid way to continue, by “radicalizing the moderate relativism”  to make justice what the “stronger thought was good for him” . However, his commercial interest firmly in mind, Thrasymachus refuses to budge and so weakens his philosophical position. He attempts to cross this chasm with the rather weak rejoinder that “no one who exercises a skill ever makes a mistake” . In other words, rulers are only truly 'rulers’ (in the precise meaning of the word) when they make no mistakes. This takes Cleitophon’s point into account, but allows Socrates to prove the incoherence of affirming “both techne and relativism.” 

Thrasymachus’ ideas are already seeming somewhat flawed, but what else does he have to say? His world is divided very starkly into 'ruler’ and 'ruled’, with different moralities and interests for each. The morality of the ruler is inherent to their position, so Thrasymachus mainly discusses the best course of action for the masses. For them, the safety blanket of being 'just’ simply through their position doesn’t exist, so they may have a choice. They could choose to be just, but Thrasymachus rejects this as a “noble simplicity”  which simply rewards others at no benefit to the self. Indeed, the values we understand as applying to being just, such as common sense and wisdom, apparently relate far better to injustice. It is “stronger, more free and more powerful” ; benefiting the self where normal morality cannot. So, why on earth is anyone just? Socrates has an answer to this, (that injustice “does violence to the soul, for which no gain can compensate” ), but what does our Sophist have to say? Thrasymachus has various explanations for this, beyond simply being ignorant of reality. The ruling classes trumpet moral goodness as a virtue, when in fact it is simply a “device”  to entice servitude. Indeed, for his state to operate, the immorality (as it would generally be seen) of the rulers has to exist simultaneously with the general justness of the masses. If everyone acted like the “stronger”, anarchy would ensue, and the ruler would be a “prisoner of his own power”  similar to that seen in Hobbes’ state of nature.  Also, Thrasymachus has a theory about the relative power of injustice. When we act injustly towards someone, we are benefiting and so feel positively. However, when the same happens to us, we feel negatively, and importantly, the negative feeling after the experience is stronger than the joy of acting it. Therefore, we make a pact in society to be just, due to our “fear of experiencing it” . This contrasts with the morality of most thinkers, who argue for moral goodness having a benefit, in and of itself.

This cynicism may be due to Thrasymachus’ theory being concerned entirely with “external or political justice” , in stark contrast to Socrates’ focus on what is “best for the soul” , i.e. “internal or psychic”  justice. In the world of the Sophist, “successful selfishness is the true end of life” . In other words, we exist for “pleonexia, for getting more than is due” . This comes through the accumulation of advantages, such as property, money and power. Indeed, morality, in the warped way Thrasymachus understands it, itself rests on success. If we steal and get away with it we have gained, but if caught are punished. Therefore, the morality exists, not in the action as we would see it, but in the societal awareness of it. However, he doesn’t seem to outline the cause and effect of this plan. Does the successful thief naturally rise to the top, and so become right ('conclusive’ reading), or is the right-thinking (i.e. entirely selfish) thief successful, because of this morality? This is another example of 'justice rests with the stronger’ lacking a sound philosophical basis.

How can Thrasymachus’ position be defined? It has been called many things  through the centuries, from legalism  to Thucydidean cynicism , but some of the arguments seem to be refutable. He isn’t a general immoralist, as while he believes justice is not a virtue, he doesn’t actually say it’s a vice either (simply “noble simplicity” .) His position has many similarities with Neitzschean immoralism, but importantly differs. For Neitzsche, justice is the “device of the weak”  to constrain the strong, or 'übermensch’. Thrasymachus, while taking a similarly cynical view, reverses the position of the weak and strong. Also, his thinking cannot simply be mindless waffle , as it has provoked so much enlightened discussion from Plato onwards. However, a few things can be said. Thrasymachus is a greatly flawed orator, accepting far too easily  Socrates’ “lemma that the way we talk is never mistaken” , and giving up his argument (to be continued with Glaucon and Ademantius). The best definition of his position seems to be that he combines “ethical nihilism with psychological egoism” . In other words, he believes that there are no static moral truths, beyond the foundational fact that humans are inherently and ultimately self-interested.

This gets to the heart of a point moral theorists have a great difficulty in explaining; that of profitability. On a basic, economic level, the “common experience of men”  would agree that being “injustice is more profitable than justice” . In Thrasymachus’ words, “a just man comes worse than an unjust in every situation.”  So, why is that not our natural mode of existence? The answer to that question really rests on the understanding of morality, that Thrasymachus may be attempting to attack. For example, if morality is understood to be normative and universal, then it is inherently accepted by all persons of a rational nature. This goes back to Plato’s forms, that there are absolute moral truths (or the “universal principle of the human frame”  from Hume), which the morally inquisitive may discover. This, I believe, is currently the most popular understanding of morality, as a public system of eternal codes. Thrasymachus’ position should pose no threat to this belief, as it gives scant justification for its ethical nihilism. He fails to address why morality derives from the ruling class, including what would happen in a communitarian society, or why the “weak” masses cannot find true justice for themselves.

However, many moral thinkers do not believe in static moral truths either, following a form of ethical relativism. This, in its extreme form, is a tale of individual atomism, but more often refers to morality being dependent upon the particular time period and society in question. At first glance, this seems to have similarities with Thrasymachus’ thinking, but great differences emerge. Most relativists (as opposed to skeptics) do not doubt the existence of moral truths; instead disagreeing with their universal application. Furthermore, true relativists would object to Thrasymachus’ dependence on an objective moral (i.e. “the stronger.”)

It is important here to note again the work of Hume, a moral philosopher who was greatly interested in dismantling the ethical rationalism we find in Plato, yet has much to help us reject Thrasymachus. One of the Sophist’s main points is the obvious logical consequence of selfish humans being their acting selfishly. However, this infers a belief in human rationality. Hume strongly rejected this, writing that “reason is… the slave of the passions.”  In other words, there is no problem with thinking both “injustice would benefit me more than being just” and “I want to be just”.

Despite living in an age of great cynicism about the political process, I do not believe many would follow Thrasymachus in his degree of negativity about the ruling class. If the powerful were achieving their own ends to the harm of the general populace, it infers either apathy or ignorance. The former seems unlikely, as the most minor government mistakes can (through an abrasive media) whip many into a frenzy, calling for mass resignations and other penalties. Similarly, the latter does not seem believable, requiring a position of power for the ruling class only found in the 'Illuminati’ of pulp fiction. Therefore, the thesis that the government is actively harming us for its own ends, without our knowledge or concern, seems problematic. That is not to say that all governments are entirely other-regarding, but the general trend is towards better and more able governance. Thrasymachus’ position may have been “a true picture of some Greek governments”  in 380BC, but 2400 years later the situation is certainly not as he thought.

In conclusion, I do not believe that Thrasymachus’ position in Plato’s Republic poses a threat to morality. It does not damage any major train of moral thought, and is a deeply flawed theory in its own right. While it has interesting consequences for human psychology, it is less useful for our discussion of morality.