Critically assess Mill's distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures
Mill’s assertion that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others” was a major revision of utilitarian thought, adding complexity to what had seemed a simple theory. Bentham considered pleasure to be synonymous with “benefit, advantage, … good, or happiness,” and believed that the greatest pleasure for the greatest number was the most moral path. Mill added a qualitative aspect to this merely quantitative calculus, by denying the equality of all pleasures. In his thinking, we should still maximise our pleasure, but here ‘pleasure’ refers to the indulgence of “higher” faculties, which only humans possess. This essay will discuss whether such a distinction can be justified on its own merits, and as part of the wider utilitarian canon. Can utilitarianism’s focus on maximising pleasure co-exist with the idea that some pleasures should be preferable to others? I will discuss both the values and criticisms, and come to the conclusion that, while it can be seen as more logically sound than Bentham’s ideals, it leaves major flaws without repairs, and introduces several of its own, leaving utilitarianism in a precarious state.
Certainly, Bentham’s utilitarianism has identifiable problems. His theory seems to condone a great pain for a small number of people, as long as the many receive enough enjoyment to outweigh the equation. For example, Roman gladiatorial combat pitting slaves against lions, with its inevitable consequence for the slaves, is quite moral; as long as there are a great enough number of spectators present and enjoying the show. Mill addresses this criticism, as schadenfreude can be considered 'lowly’ and so less important. In other words, the pain of the few slaves outweighs the pleasure of the many, even though the totals may be the opposite. If this is true, then 'pleasure’ really refers more to what “should” be and not what is, and so is an idealist point. Ideas of what 'should’ make people happy play little part in Bentham’s thinking.
Perhaps felicific calculus is an attempt to bring mathematics into a field, human happiness, where it cannot be applied. Can joy or pain ever really be given a value? Perhaps it will in time, but with our current understanding of the social sciences it remains extremely difficult, if not impossible. Most people cannot even dependably value their own happiness, without trying to do it for others or a whole group. In adding a qualitative aspect, Mill acknowledges the limits of directly comparing the happiness of different peoples and activities.
A simpler criticism of Bentham is that it advocates no human betterment or development. Many of the greatest developments in art and science have taken enormous toil and sacrifice. Some detractors went further, arguing that the theory assumed humans to be no more than animals, with simple pleasures and pains. Mill’s distinction can be seen to rectify this flaw, as activities which enhance human life are 'higher’ and more worthy of pursuit. Even though a great sculpture can take years to create, the pleasure gained from its completion is on a different level from years spent in idleness.
Another, if only surface, advantage to Mill’s work is that it is ostensibly logical. Everyone has felt 'different’ pleasures in their life, though whether due to biological differences or deeper reasons remains uncertain. Mill does seem to be appealing to common sense, that we can have pleasures for different parts of our nature. The only criticism I can have here is that the pleasure most required for the survival of the human race, and thought by many biologists to be our essential reason for being, would likely be considered 'lower’, and so worthy of avoidance. This would not be a safe basis for a more widely followed theory.
While Mill’s work certainly seems to improve on Bentham, serious inadequacies remain. Some are lodged deep within utilitarianism itself, but others are unfortunately added by Mill himself. For example, he nullifies the hope of a true felicific calculus. While we may, one day, be able to quantify amounts of pleasure, putting universal units on the quality of such will remain impossible. Qualities differ by person, time, situation, and innumerable other variables. For this reason, the theory becomes far more complicated, and harder to apply to everyday life. Arguably, Mill succeeds only in making utilitarianism complex enough to remove any hope of becoming a mainstream personal philosophy.
The idea of a higher pleasure hinges on the idea that humans are better, in having higher cognitive faculties, than animals, and so can look for a different form of happiness. While our cognitive advantages cannot be argued with, are humans really better than animals? Experience of the world seems to show that many spend their time negatively, creating more pain and suffering than their own pleasure could ever make up for. After all, the ultimate pain, in terms of lack of joy, is death, and most death in the world is caused, directly or otherwise, by humans. One could almost argue that, in terms of happiness, we are in fact far below animals in terms of its observance. Humans mainly follow other goals, such as wealth or power, which are not proven to have direct or strong correlations with happiness.
If the ultimate pleasure is sought through a “higher” path, why do we all not follow it? Mill’s answer to this question seems to create a circular logic. (Some humans do not follow his path of higher pleasures, because they are weak, or narrow-minded, or ignorant. They are such, mainly because they do not follow the higher path.) Also, for any theory, the defence that those who do not follow it are inferior, and so can be ignored, is at best an ignoble one. Mill is making assumptions about what is best for human happiness, while citing no empirical evidence, or showing much authority to make such claims.
Perhaps the most basic problem with Mill’s distinction is that, while it seeks to be a revision of utilitarianism, it is in fact a rejection of basic utilitarian principles, and so is either a new theory, or logically incoherent. For example, Mill clearly states that it is better to be unhappy as “Socrates” than happy as a “fool”. This repudiates the utilitarian notion that people should strive for the greatest happiness of the greatest number above all else. Favouring another path, such as intellect, is a different theory altogether. Mill tries to argue that Socrates is the happier in the end, as he has more pleasure of the 'higher’ sort, but it does seem an attempt to justify an un-utilitarian notion. Also, whether his access to 'higher’ realms did actually bring Socrates much pleasure, of any kind, is rather debatable.
A major part of the argument centres around how a 'higher’ pleasure can be decided as such. He relies on the testimony of those who have “experience of both” , believing that if they choose between two pleasures they have experienced, it must be higher. The exact details of this idea have been debated over time, but the central reliance on an 'expert’ third party remains. This seems to introduce another circular argument, whereby only those competently acquainted with a topic can judge, but presumably only the 'judges’ can decide who is competently acquainted enough to join their number. In other words, it advocates (in extremity) a system of philosopher kings , where pleasures are ranked by those in the 'know’, who are such because they call themselves 'learned’. At the other extreme, the idea could be read to enforce 'mob rule’, in which the majority decide which pleasures are desirable. If either power then had the ability to make 'undesirable’ pleasures unattainable to the powerless, this could create a dangerously dictatorial situation. Such visions seem far removed from the original ideal of the highest happiness desired by Bentham, and have been used to justify, if not explain, some decidedly unhappy situations. Negative associations may not be Mill’s fault, but he could do more to encourage the rights of the individual in directing their actions towards happiness, whether higher or lower.
As I have shown, Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures does have value. It negates some of the more obvious criticism’s of Bentham’s work, and takes it to what is ostensibly the logical next step. However, in leaving old difficulties untouched, such as the nature of quantifying happiness, and introducing new ones, such as assumptions about the deepest nature of man, the distinction becomes less useful. It would likely take another revision, more dramatic than Mill’s, to make utilitarianism a fully rational theory of human morality.