Could we be both free and determined?
This essay will discuss whether a human actor can be both free and determined. It will examine the issues of determinism, free will and moral responsibility separately, and how they interlink towards a “theory of action”. After arguing for the necessary existence of determinism and free will in some form, it will conclude that, based on current evidence, compatibilism provides the only suitable answer.
First, we must decide what ‘free’ and 'determined’ mean. Both are essentially contested concepts, with great etymological debates raging over their definition. However, there are certain general principles. Being 'free’ (equated here with 'freedom’ and 'free will’) is usually related to the popular 'could have done otherwise’ principle, I.e. That we are free when choosing to do A, if we could equally have done B. There are holes in this definition, such as the implications and degree of coercion or suggestion, but it will form a suitable basis for discussion. Similarly, 'determined’ can be understood as “what happens is necessitated by what has already gone before”, so that there is only one possible outcome to events. Whether this refers to a degree of causality, or eternal determinism (one outcome to the universe has been set in stone since the beginning) is at the heart of the debate.
Furthermore, what do the two terms seek to influence? I take them as concerning an 'action’, using that in a general sense of any physical or psychological change caused by human activity. Therefore, everything from my next thought to where I eat my last meal are actions. But what initiates an action? I posit that an action must be either random, having no higher probability of occurring or not occurring in any particular way; or caused, with pre-conditions and 'motives’ for the occurrence. In other words, there is a reason for something happening, or no reason; there can be no other option. However, it is hard to find an action which can be truly called 'random’. Some scientists have argued that the move from Newtonian to quantum mechanical physics has introduced a degree of 'true’ randomness, but this essay is solely concerned with beings on the supra-atomic level.
But what if causation isn’t necessary? In his book “An Essay on Free Will”, Gary Watson notes that van Inwagen argues we can distinguish between “causation and causal necessitation”. For example, willing a football to be kicked with no other impediments necessitates a movement of the object, rather than acting as a causal line. Zimmerman points out that this requires choices to have either no motivation, or motivations to be “outside the causal order”. Both are rejected out of hand: a total lack of motivation would make choices a random decision no different from inanimate objects, and motivations, (I.e. Causes for actions) seem to be inherently connected to the “causal order”. (The first dismissal may have certain problems, but the second seems sound) In addition, there is the fact that determinism seems, even if it cannot be objectively proven, to be “unfalsifiable”. As noted, physics is a long way from providing any definite answers, and centuries of philosophical debate have not produced a 'killer blow’ for either side.
The primary argument against determinism is that of libertarians, who believe in free will, but not in a determined world. Their argument has some advantages, such as eliminating the compromises required for integration in compatibilism, and enjoying popular support outside academia. However, it lacks a strong, independent proof of the non-existence of determinism, relying on how it relates to free will.
The concept of being 'free’ must similarly be considered. Essentially, the discovery depends on the definition used, as over “two hundred senses of the word” have been found. Sartre noted that we are condemned to be free, as being 'not free’ isn’t an option. A difficulty comes when our desires and actions diverge. For example, being hooked on cocaine, as long as it was begun without coercion, could be considered a 'free’ action. However, to what extent does the continuing addiction rely on the desires of the human consciousness, or the artificially-created chemical imbalances in the brain? If the addiction is a case of the consciousness being determined by other factors, then it could be argued that addiction is, if not completely, then at least a loss of freedom. Similarly, a fear of travelling in elevators reduces freedom in a shopping centre, despite the person being ostensibly 'free’ to fight the fear and use the device. Van Inwagen discusses how our natures are, to some extent, shaped by our actions, rather than the commonly-accepted reverse. If so, every time a phobia is allowed to control an action, the person may in fact be increasing the phobia itself; in effect reducing their own freedom.
Why the existence of free will matters is the connection philosophers through the ages have made between it and moral responsibility. Moral responsibility, in turn, is the basis of numerous important concepts, such as the religious 'Heaven and Hell’, and justice systems of punishing the 'evil’. If we are not morally responsible for our actions, it seems unfair to be punished in this life or the next, making this is an important political as well as philosophical concern. Kant argued that our “experience of moral obligation” makes us free as far as our will is concerned, which provides a sense of moral obligation.
A case against being 'free’, pessimism, argues that we are not free, whether determinism exists or not. This is because freedom would require control over that which affects our decisions, I.e. Mental aspects of our nature. No human can influence their genes and formative upbringing, and therefore mental states. Any attempt to change “such a character trait” will create an infinite regress, with the next nature depending on the previous one, eventually working back to the events outside the actor’s control. If we cannot change who we are, then we are stuck without freedom. However, the theory assumes the total dominance of nature, with no concern given to people acting 'against’ their nature, or in an unpredictable nature.
Considering compatibilism, Gardner Williams argues that free-will and determinism naturally go together, as freedom is self-determination, which is obviously a category of determinism. In other words, when a person is allowed to perform act A or B, choosing A is a display of free will. The fact that the preference for A may have been incubated at a previous date does not invalidate the inherent freedom of the decision. Hence, causation creates our 'will’, rather than obstructing, as assumed by incompatibilists. Simply put, choosing what is preferred is not being unfree, as (when a choice has to be made) choosing what is not preferred would be illogical. Under this thinking, the only way decisions can be limited is by external constraints, such as coercion by a third party. Pushing a button because of a desired outcome is a free choice, whereas the same action caused by a threat of violence is not.
An argument against this, such as advanced by Inwagen, is that our motives made the drink the “obvious” choice. For example, if the world could be reset to the instant before the choice was made, a hundred times out of a hundred we would choose the drink, as our desires at that moment point to the same place. To use his example, our culture has socialized us to answer a telephone when it rings, so, while being in the proximity of a ringing telephone, answering it is the only possible outcome. Therefore, few of our actions are really 'free’, as they are simply the composite outcomes of existing motives applied to momentary circumstances.
One of the main attacks on the dominance of compatibilism is van Inwagen’s famous “Consequence argument”. This essentially argues that is determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of actions before our birth, over which we obviously had no control. So, how can we possibly be free? The author answers this with a belief that determinism is false, as well as being incompatible with freedom. However, Spinoza makes the point that, as we are not conscious of our determined desires and outcomes, we are effectively free. In other words, as we can’t see the future, whether it is determined or not is largely irrelevant to our current condition. An extrapolation of this is that, in the main, the deciding factor of our freedom is our self-attribution as such. If we consider ourselves to be free, we will make choices based on that assumption, and so become morally responsible for the outcomes. Whether the outcomes were set in stone beforehand can be considered irrelevant, to the moral value of actions.
In conclusion, while no argument is perfect, it appears that we can be both free and determined, therefore supporting compatibilism. However, the discussion will almost certainly never reach a conclusion, and it would arguably be best to follow Wilson’s advice to devote energies “to other pursuits”.