Assess the significance of new security challenges in the post-Cold War world
This essay will consider the significance of new security challenges in the world, during the last two decades. Whether the main threat is from ‘new’ concerns such as population expansion or environmental damage, or modifications of eternal issues, it is clear that the “peace dividend” envisaged at the end of the Cold War is being badly spent. The essay will discuss both realist concerns of securing the state, and the 'Canadian’ school of human security, regarding the security of the person.
The strongest victor from the weapons proliferation of the post-Soviet period has been international terrorism. Patchy, largely home-made resistance movements of the Second World War era (and earlier), have been replaced with outfits as well-equipped as the national forces they encounter. Bullet-proofing windows is becoming less effective when many groups have access to high-powered rifles, rocket launchers and explosives; nevermind the strange phenomenon of terrorists equipped with air and naval forces. This can be seen in Sri Lanka, where the LTTE (considered a terrorist organisation by 32 countries) possesses a light aircraft and attack boats. Anti-terrorism strategies, currently being proven inadequate at best in Iraq, will have to be largely rewritten to cope with these new threats.
Furthermore, above simply arming existing groups, the 'success’ of current campaigns may well encourage a multiplier effect of terrorists for innumerable social, economic and cultural concerns. In Northern Ireland, it could be argued that terrorism was largely silenced after a political solution was (hopefully) found for both sides. With current objectives for some groups ranging from a global Islamic caliphate and destruction of 'Western’ culture, to eradication of whole ethnic groups, it is hard to see their concerns being fully addressed. This relates, (particularly but not solely regarding religious extremists) to a perceived loss of pragmatism among terrorists. When the loss of innocent human life, or of the instigators themselves, is considered desirable, this poses new and worrying concerns for the preparation of societies for such attacks. The destruction in Madrid and London shows that relatively small terrorist cells, with limited training and skill, can cause significant carnage.
While luckily mostly unsuccessful, the Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated in 1995 the possibilities for a well-financed and equipped terrorist cell. It has been estimated that, with a very few changes of luck and circumstance, their plans could well have resulted in deaths in the tens of thousands. While the exact format of a rich group manned largely by doctorate-holding scientists may not be repeated in the short or medium term, it is a chilling reminder of the power of non-state actors to be significant security factors. Furthermore, the incident points to the future possibility of terrorists acquiring significant weapons of mass destruction. With the huge stockpiles of variably secured plutonium and uranium in Russia and elsewhere, it seems inevitable that a Fleming-esque conclusion will occur eventually. For example, a deal struck between the Russians and the US allowed for 500 tons of weapons-usable plutonium to be sold for civilian use. However, for economic reasons, the program was spread over 20 years. While better for reprocessing market economics, this poses a great security concern of leaving large quantities of fissile materials in possibly non-secure locations. Due to deficiencies in Soviet-era record keeping, it is quite possible that some materials are already missing.
However, despite significant media attention, it would be wrong to assume that terrorism is necessarily the main concern in this new world. Without the iron fist of dual superpowers to (largely) contain disturbances in their 'back yards’, previously festering conflicts have been allowed to erupt. Perhaps the most obvious case of this has been the Balkans, which has been blighted by conflict over most of the last two decades. Sparked by post-Soviet secessionist concerns (and the “security deficit” ), it evolved into a multi-level mire of cultural, social and ethnic hatred. Arguably, the massacres of Foča and Srebrenica are displays of the failure of modern, consent-based “collective security” . This can be seen further afield in the disaster of Rwanda, where 'burnt fingers’ in Mogadishu made the UN (and US) reluctant to get involved in another African conflict. While not unique to recent times, the move from superpower unilateralism to compromise multilateralism may well have deepened the possibility of genocides continuing without short-term intervention. Unlike during the Cold War, powerful states see less strategic advantage in singular foreign intervention, without the carrot of keeping influence or territory from a global foe. This is not, of course, to say that current genocides, such as in the Darfur region of Sudan, would not (or did not) occur under the Cold War, but the new world order certainly introduces previously-unconsidered concerns to the equation.
Perhaps more worrying than current conflicts are possible, or possibly imminent ones. In South America, Columbia, Venezuela and Ecuador recently went to a, (while partly media-driven) war footing over a Columbian incursion to Venezuelan territory. With the “imperialist empire” bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-American states nearby have taken the opportunity to be more vocal in their condemnation and aggressiveness. While the current situation is difficult, uniformed American troops fighting in South America once more (a not inconceivable possibility in the medium-term) would almost certainly be worse. Similar dangerous areas can be seen in Iran and Taiwan, with the possibility of the world’s most powerful army being drawn into further conflicts it cannot win, or negotiate its way out of. During the Cold War, some sort of appeasement or agreement with the Soviets could greatly ease American extraction from battlefields. In the new world order, with a multiplicity of aggressive states, invaders may have to prepare for far longer engagements. For example, Presidential candidate Senator McCain noted in an interview he would be happy to leave troops in Iraq for “a hundred” years
Of course, the period since 1991 has not just modified eternal challenges, but created ones rarely previously considered. While Thomas Malthus talked of population overload in the late 18th century, it is only now we are seeing the reality of an exponentionally expanding humanity. While we have, as a planet, the means to feed and water many more than we currently do, regional disparities have left some areas dangerously deficient in basic necessities. Population growth in sub-Saharan Africa, combined with natural disasters and other problems, have helped create a powder keg of desperate groups willing to fight for their survival. While this is undoubtedly a developing problem, it can already be seen in sections of the Darfur conflict, where some are fighting for the security of water in an increasingly populous nation. (Which, in Sudan, has doubled in less than 30 years)
Of course, few states are willing to depend only on the bare necessities. Related to expanding populations, modern communications developments are further opening the eyes of the 'Third world’ to the relative opulence enjoyed by developed nations. This, especially when tied into issues concerning previous colonisation, creates an undercurrent of sentiment against developed nations, or more generically “the North” . While currently mainly a cultural issue, in the future “anger and.. apathy” in the “global ghetto” will likely help fuel terrorism and popular insurgencies. A degree of this can already be seen in Islamic elements in Somalia, basing part of their political aims on a rejection of 'Northern’ or 'Western’ ideology.
While an eternal factor, the last two decades have seen an explosion in possible and real conflict for other resources. It is debatable if the two Gulf wars, at least in part, related to an energy-hungry superpower securing dwindling oil supplies, considered a “key Western resource”. Such reserves have given Russia a bravado not previously seen since the fall of the USSR, financing military confidence to the point of having bombers fly over America aircraft carriers. However, it is in Africa that such conflicts are likely to be the most poisonous. Since colonisation and before it, Africa has been blighted by the attempts of various groups to secure its precious bounty. The new factor currently is the input of China in Africa, unusual as a state not colonially powerful in the area, yet projecting great influence over the region. Whether it be through trading with governments most of the outside world would consider undesirable (Zimbabwe), or tacitly allowing ethnic groups to fight over the ability to supply it with the resources it desires (Sudan), China is playing a major part in militarising Africa. While not currently as heinous as past aggressors, (e.g. Franco-Belgian troops in the Zaire in 1978 for cobalt supplies ), China poses as an uncertain moral leader in the region. As it develops into an undeniable superpower in its own right, the Chinese government is becoming less interested in playing 'follow-the-leader’ to gain international appreciation.
In conclusion, there are various threats to security in this new world that pose a serious threat. It remains extremely unclear whether issues such as terrorism, population or resource dependence will prove the most destabilising in the future; but it is clear that they will all have an affect on new security concerns.