Assess the criticisms which have been made of Richard Neustadt’s theory of ‘presidential power’
Richard Neustadt attempts to explain the strategies of presidential power through the importance of “personal powers” – primarily bargaining and persuasion. Other oft-discussed elements such as “status and authority” give advantages, but as a purely institutional actor the President is ‘weak’. Over time the theory has become a “theoretical paradigm” in its field, and been subjected to numerous criticisms. This essay will discuss the validity of three major objections: moral ends, competing theories, and predictive failures.
A common criticism of the work is that it concentrates too heavily on the means of attaining power, without just concern for what Roosevelt termed “moral leadership” . The description “modern Machiavelli” seems an unfair exaggeration, but Neustadt does avoid advising his putative Presidents about what to do with the influence their persuasion might bring. It has been argued that this amoral vacuum gave “intellectual support” to a more 'imperial’ style of presidency, embodied by Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Indeed, Neustadt himself accepted that such characters left his argument “still valid… but not nearly as helpful” . He was hoping that a more influential President would improve the governmental system, but unfortunately this enthusiasm has become “tempered by time” . However, this need not be a strong criticism of the theory as written. Neustadt was not trying to explain the detailed ethics of the modern Presidency, nor provide a universal handbook for their actions “hour by hour”. The criticism therefore seems to unfairly attack a theory over a question it was never claiming to answer. In other words, there can be great value in a study of presidential power on its own merits. The ends to which it may be put by future leaders, “powerful temptations for abuse” from Watergate to warrant-less phone-tapping , are not Neustadt’s moral responsibility.
The theory, appearing in '50s journal articles and particularly 1960’s “Presidential Power”, adds a form of behavioural analysis to a field previously dominated by theoretical studies of “formal powers vested in the Presidency” . A popular criticism comes from those who prefer the previous standard, arguing that he is wrong to view the use of 'hard’ powers (such as the “literary theory of the Constitution” ) as “weak” . According to Pious, persuasion may affect power “at the margins” , but cannot be the primary agent. He sources presidential power essentially as Corwin did , in the institutional formalities afforded by the position. Of course, this can be seen as an argument over degree, but the margins are wide enough to make it an important challenge to Neustadt’s work. The lack of empirical research in this area was regularly berated by Neustadt himself , and largely continues to this day. Without such information, it is exceedingly difficult to judge the relative explanatory value of the 'institutional’ and 'personal’ models.
Howell perceives a defect in both major models, that they underestimate “unilateral” powers. These include Executive Orders, re-reading the Constitution and national security directives. The argument here is that the President’s main power is found in his unique abilities to act without prompting or consultation. This has the major advantage of allowing him to move first, so opponents can either grant his wishes or start a campaign on the back foot. Also, “compromises or majorities” are inherently not a concern, as the President becomes the “director of change” . This undermines Neustadt’s assertion that, without persuasive abilities, the President is only left with his 'weak’ formal powers. Indeed, the unilateral model seems the very “antithesis” of Neustadt’s work, denying any meaningful value to quiet bargaining.
This relates to the importance (or otherwise) of public pressure mentioned below, but also raises the question: do unilateral powers and persuasiveness not depend on the same factors? Without the ability to persuade others of the value of his plans, the President can be (and often has been) overruled by Congress, the Supreme Court and other institutions. While being a first-mover certainly affords advantages, it is by no means an assurance of success. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted after the events of September 11th 2001 by President Bush, would appear as context giving the leader carte blanche to act in his nation’s interest. Indeed, the President sold the change as so necessary to “repel sudden attacks” that no patriot could refuse, and the Act was signed into law four days after being introduced to the House of Representatives. However, even with an 86% approval rating by September 14th, he was required by Congress to put strict time limits on the Act, and had to shrink it at the subsequent reappraisal. Perhaps a more persuasive character, open to compromise on some of the divisive sections, could have dealt better with the constraints of his power.
One common method of assessing a theory is the degree to which it predicts future events. For example, late 20th century realism was roundly attacked for failing to anticipate the explosive dissolution of the USSR. Neustadt’s work has been criticized in this regard, for missing the development of major changes. A lack of predictive accuracy doesn’t negate a theory’s value in and of itself, but raises doubts about the background assumptions and methodology used. Can an accurate explanation of the past and present totally fail when assessing future trends?
One such trend is the continuous and notable growth of Presidential power. Corwin states that the “history of the Presidency is a history of aggrandizement” , particularly over the eighty years since the New Deal. This raises a fairly obvious problem for Neustadt, i.e. how can a Presidency “fundamentally personal in nature” be subject to long-term trends in a single, unyielding direction? It seems highly unlikely that the personal traits of 44 men (or even the most recent 13) have shifted so concertedly, inferring that other factors are taking the lead. Can the theory account for this? I believe it can. Neustadt was writing in response to the then dominant theory, institutional analysis. Today we might prefer “Presidential Power” to reference non-personal factors more heavily, but this this would have seemed unnecessary in the intellectual climate of 1960. In turn, Neustadt himself (particularly in the 1980 revision) has addressed the issue, reminding us that an argument for the primacy of personal abilities doesn’t rule out all other factors.
A second major predictive failure has been the rise of public pressure. Kernell argues that Neustadt underestimated this, in part because the theory is “exclusively focused” on the 'Washington community’. While Neustadt considers both prestige and reputation (the relationship with the public and “Washington community” respectively), he views professional reputation as the more important to a President’s success. Often the two goals pull a leader in different directions, and in the modern media environment prestige has the “dominating force” . Gallup popularity polls, which attempt to measure prestige, have become the yardstick of presidential success, rather than the approval of party bosses or Congressional leaders. Perhaps a deeper cause of this failure is that, if he were to accept it, Neustadt would be undermining the possible contribution of bargaining . If the President is mainly reacting to public campaigns, his power is not determined by his ability to compromise, but by outside events and his media savvy.
Of course, this criticism hinges on whether public pressure really has the importance today which some afford it. Communication improvements have certainly made a multitude of voices more easily heard, but it is highly debatable whether this has changed the underlying operation of the government system. For example, we could view the recent demonstrations by 'regular people’ against healthcare reform as dawning a new age in public pressure, or simply the persons of Neustadt’s interest (party bosses, media tycoons, etc.) utilizing public confusion to further their own, 'Washingtonian’ aims. In other words, merely noting an increased volume and quantity of voices doesn’t prove a shift in the true power base.
It is clear that Neustadt’s 1960 theory had flaws, both in its appreciation of contemporary events and how it explains the world 49 years later. However, both through a reappraisal of its key insights and the additions made in further works, it remains a crucial explanation of presidential power.